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Jensen: The Continuing Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty

THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Erik M. Jensen*

Imagination is a wonderful thing. Close your eyes, and you
can walk through the looking glass into a new, and perhaps
better, world. I read James A. Poore III's essay, The Constitution
of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes,1 as such an enjoyable flight of fancy.
Mr. Poore might be right that the United States would be a
better place if constitutional limitations applied in full force
against tribal governments, just as those limitations apply to
federal and state governments. Both tribal members and nonmembers could then invoke those protections against tribal governments in tribal courts, and federal judges would be able to
review the constitutional rulings of those courts.2
But that is not the law, and it has never been the law. I am
not a cultural relativist; I too am willing to defend the
superiority of American constitutional principles. But Poore's
evidence does not come close to making out a case that tribes
have lost all aspects of their traditional sovereignty or that
tribal power is limited by the Constitution in the way he
suggests. Poore has neither modern Supreme Court jurisprudence nor modern congressional understanding on his side.
In Part I, I defend tribal sovereignty against Mr. Poore's
attack. In Part II, I challenge a few specific points that Poore
makes along the way, points he incorrectly marshals in support
of the proposition that tribal sovereignty died long ago. In Part
III, I consider whether Mr. Poore's conception of American
Indian law might be in our future, even if it is not part of our
past.
. David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I thank my
colleague Jon Entin for many valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1.
59 MoNT. L. REv. 51 (1998).
2. Id. at 79. Poore writes that federal courts should at least have the power to
enjoin tribal actions.
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I. A GENERAL DEFENSE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY
TRUMPS LOGIC

Poore asks rhetorically, "How can it be that within the borders of the United States, citizens - both Indian citizens and
non-Indian citizens - of the United States may be subject to un3
constitutional actions by tribal governments and tribal courts?"
As I understand him, Poore's basic contention is that tribal
sovereignty is a dinosaur. It existed once, but it disappeared
long ago. Tribal power today is entirely a consequence of congressional delegation. 4 Although we might speak of this delegated power as "sovereign," says Poore, we should stop pretending that tribes are true sovereigns immune from constitutional dictates: "[B]y virtue of their assimilation into the United
States, Indian tribes have lost all their retained powers that are
inconsistent with the rights of citizens of the United States."5
The prevailing understanding of the relationship of tribes to the
Constitution is therefore wrong: "The perception that the Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes is derived from the
assumption that Indian tribes have retained some element of
6
their original sovereignty."
"Perception"? "Assumption"?
The fundamental problem with Poore's position is that the
existence of what he calls "retained sovereignty" - the
sovereignty attributable to the tribes' pre-constitutional status is far more than an assumption. It is the law of the land. As
Felix Cohen put it in 1942, in a passage that has been blessed by
the Supreme Court, "Perhaps the most basic principle of all
Indian law.., is the principle that those powers which are law3. Id. at 51. A niggling point: This is a peculiar way to put the question. The
actions Poore has in mind are unconstitutional only to the extent that the Constitution
applies in the way he says it does. If the Constitution does not work that way, then, by
definition, the actions are not unconstitutional. Actions in French courts that do not
satisfy American constitutional standards are not "unconstitutional."
4. Id. at 53-54.
5. Id. at 53. Tribes do have power, Poore concedes, and we might use the term
"sovereignty" to refer to that power. But this sovereignty, Poore argues, has nothing to
do with the tribes' antedating the Constitution:
[T]he retained sovereignty that tribes lost by integration into the United States
and by congressional action has been replaced, in part, by sovereign powers
granted to tribes by Congress. The sovereign powers that tribes now possess,
including inherent powers [i.e., those necessary to implement specific powers
that have been granted], flow from congressional action and are therefore
subject to the Constitution.
Id. at 55.
6. Id. at 53.
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fully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated
powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extin7
guished."
The Cohen principle is not self-evident, of course, and anyone can knock logical holes in the idea that tribes are sovereign.
Poore does that job perfectly well.
For example, from a logician's perspective, it seems peculiar
indeed for Indian law scholars and practitioners to talk simultaneously about tribal "sovereignty" and about the federal plenary
power doctrine - the idea that American Indian tribes are ultimately under the control of Congress. The plenary power doctrine, Poore suggests, "subjects tribes' retained sovereignty to
complete defeasance,"8 and it is reasonable to question what
sovereignty means if someone else can snap his fingers and
make the sovereign power disappear. 9
Adding to the conceptual difficulty is the idea that the federal government has a fiduciary obligation to protect the tribes.
The so-called "trust" doctrine comes from one of the cases in the
famous John Marshall trilogy. 10 How is the notion of the United
States government as "guardian" of the Indian "ward" - Justice
Marshall's terms1 1 - consistent with the idea of retained sovereignty?
Those are perfectly good questions, but they are irrelevant
to the ultimate practical issue. We talk about both sovereignty
and federal plenary power, about both sovereignty and the
United States' obligations as trustee for the tribes, because the
7.

FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (photo. reprint 1971)

(1942) (emphasis in original); see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
That the passage has been blessed does not mean that its effect on a particular set of
facts is clear or that all members of the Court accept the proposition. Dissenters have
quoted Cohen to make the point that the majority in particular cases has not understood
this "most basic principle." See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 698 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Poore, supra note 1, at 53.
9. I do not mean to suggest that everyone accepts the legitimacy of the plenary
power doctrine, particularly in its most expansive form. Furthermore, those Indian law
scholars who recognize the doctrine's reality generally do so reluctantly. See, e.g., Nell
Jessup Newton, FederalPower Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 195 (1984).
10. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1831). Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), complete the trilogy.
11. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection;
rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants . . ").
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way Felix Cohen described things is the way things are. Being a
"sovereign" does not mean being all-powerful, just as the "plenary" power of Congress has its limits. 12 The retained sovereignty of Indian tribes is circumscribed, but it exists. 13 That
tension in the conception of American Indian tribes - sovereign
in some ways but subject to congressional control as well - is
4
part of the fabric of American Indian law.'
This built-in tension at the core of American Indian law
does not cripple the discipline. It shows only that determining
the status of American Indian tribes is not an exercise in logicchopping. 15 Life and the law are full of anomalies that will not
satisfy a logician. So what?
To Poore, because tribes do not fit easily into a pristine constitutional structure, logic points to the tribes' being, at most,
subdivisions of the federal government.' 6 At the other extreme, I
suppose, the tribes could be treated as distinct foreign nations,
immune from constitutional constraints, but that has not been
7
the accepted conception of tribes for years.
For Poore, there is apparently no middle ground. But why
should that be so? It is far too late in the day to conclude that
the special status of American Indian tribes does not exist simply because it does not always make perfect sense. The special
status is there, it has been recognized for decades, and, for
better or worse, it is not simply going to go away.
12. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over
the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L.
REV. 413, 418 (1988).
13. Cf Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (stressing
that weaker states do not lose sovereignty simply because they align themselves with
more powerful ones).
14. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561, which held that Georgia's criminal laws had
no effect within the boundaries of Indian country, can be interpreted as either a
statement of the importance of tribal sovereignty or as a statement of federal preemption
of state power. In Worcester, the doctrines led to the same result, and the inherent
tension between the two doctrines was not apparent. But the tension was there, and it
remains to this day.
15. I do not mean to suggest that logic plays no role (and no, I am not going to cite
Holmes on the insignificance of logic in the law).
16. "Subdivision" may be too strong a word, but I am trying to make conceptual
sense of these bodies that, according to Poore, "derive their power from the federal
government," Poore, supra note 1, at 75, and are limited by the Constitution in the same
way as the federal government.
17. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-20 (1831) (concluding
that tribes are nations but not foreign nations). My impression is that even the strongest
tribal proponents do not go so far today. Few really want the United States to cut all ties
to the tribes and allow the tribes to make it - or not make it - on their own. See Erik M.
Jensen, American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TULSA L.J. 385, 394-95 (1993).
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Of course, under the federal plenary power doctrine, Congress could make much of that special status disappear. As
Poore writes, "Congress has the power to eliminate any retained
sovereignty of Indian tribes that is inconsistent with the Constitution."' 8 Nevertheless, notwithstanding Poore's revisionist understanding of American Indian law, that has not happened explicitly. And, even with a late 1990's Congress that is less sympathetic to tribal interests than some of its predecessors have
been, such a step does not seem to be in the offing.
Part of Poore's proof that sovereignty has already disappeared involves reasoning from a handpicked selection of Supreme Court cases, discounting the multitude of cases that do
not fit his thesis. In American Indian law, one can "prove" almost any proposition by picking the right case or statute as a
starting point; much Indian law doctrine does not mesh. 19 And,
yes, there have been Supreme Court cases that can reasonably
be interpreted as denying the existence of any form of tribal sovereignty. 20 But even the recent cases that seem to have downplayed sovereignty - relegating it to a "backdrop" against which
questions of preemption are evaluated, for example 2' - have not
said that tribal sovereignty has ended.
When we step back to look at the big picture, the body of
Supreme Court jurisprudence in American Indian law, it is impossible to conclude that a Court which regularly refers to tribal
sovereignty has read retained sovereignty out of the canon. 22
18. Poore, supra note 1, at 55. Implicit in this statement is the proposition that
some aspects of retained sovereignty may be consistent with the Constitution.
19. The apparently diametric underpinnings of cases from the same era can be
striking. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (stressing tribal power of
self-government), with United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (stating that only
two sovereigns, the U.S. and the states, can exist in the U.S.).
20. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379 ("The soil and the people within [the
geographical limits of the U.S.] are under the political control of the government of the
United States, or of the states of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of
sovereignty but these two."); see Daniel L. Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death - A
Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409 (1986) (characterizing Kagama as
death of tribal sovereignty). But see Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381-82 (noting that while tribes
do not possess "full attributes of sovereignty," they are "a separate people with the power
of regulating their internal and social relations . . ").
21. The phrase originated in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 (1973). See also Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 884 (1986).
22. Poore admits that "a number of Supreme Court cases indicate... that Indian
tribes have retained sovereignty to some extent with respect to various issues," but he
says this is "generally in dicta." Poore, supra note 1, at 53-54 n.11. Moreover, he states
that "there do not appear to be any cases in which the Supreme Court has specifically
determined that the retained sovereignty has survived the congressional and other
actions discussed in this article." Id.
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Backdrops have effects, sometimes very important effects. 23
The case that, in my opinion, presented the Court with the
best opportunity to embrace the Poore thesis was Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,24 concluding in 1978 that tribes do not

have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 25 Oliphant was
hardly the product of a Court sympathetic to strong tribal
interests. Moreover, it was a case in which the Court was influenced by some of the same factors that concern Poore, particularly the lack of constitutional protection of defendants' rights in
26
tribal courts.
In Oliphant, therefore, the Court could have announced the
demise of tribal sovereignty and could have stated that, if tribal
courts are to exercise criminal jurisdiction at all, constitutional
limitations must bind those courts. Nothing like that happened.
Although some language in Oliphant makes tribal supporters
cringe - tribes have lost not only those powers that Congress
has explicitly taken away, but also those powers "inconsistent
with their status" 27 - the Court did not say that tribes have lost
I am not sure what to make of those statements. I guess it is true that no recent
case has specifically ruled, up-or-down, on the continued existence of tribal sovereignty.
But that is hardly surprising. Why would the Court discuss such a non-issue?
Moreover, in many cases, particularly those involving the application of state law
within Indian country, tribal sovereignty and federal preemption point in the same
direction - keeping the state out. See Laurence, supra note 12, at 418. The fact that it
may be impossible to determine how much of a decision was attributable to retained
sovereignty and how much to federal preemption does not mean that a reference to
sovereignty is dictum or that sovereignty is a meaningless concept. See infra note 23.
23. If nothing else, the backdrop of sovereignty has meant that state power is
presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian country. That is not a trivial
proposition. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123
(1993) (treating backdrop as presumption that state lacks power over tribal members
within reservation boundaries); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,
176 (1989) (stating that backdrop of sovereignty means that "questions of preemption... are not resolved by reference to the standards of pre-emption that have
developed in other areas of the law...
24. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
25. See id. at 212. The boundaries of Oliphant were unclear for several years
because the Court was not careful in its language. Did the Court mean to preclude
jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe - a category that could include Indians who
are members of other tribes - or only over non-Indians? That issue was resolved in Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (holding that tribal court had no jurisdiction over
Indian defendant not a member of the host tribe). Congress later intervened, permitting
tribal court jurisdiction over Indians generally. See Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1991) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301(2), (4) (1994)).
26. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12. The Court's concerns about the lack of
procedural protections were made even clearer in Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-96.
27. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).
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all sovereign powers. Quite the contrary. The Court's conclusion
- preserving tribal criminal jurisdiction over members except
insofar as Congress has taken that power away, 28 while precluding tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
in the absence of congressional action 29 - makes no sense if the
Court thought that full constitutional protections for criminal
defendants were already a necessary component of the tribal
court system.
So the Supreme Court does not think that sovereignty has
disappeared. 30 Neither, apparently, does Congress; modern Congresses have been acting as though Indian tribes occupy a
special constitutional position in America. 31 Poore suggests that
prior congressional enactments - particularly the 1924 act extending citizenship to previously unnaturalized American
Indians, 32 the Allotment Acts of the late nineteenth century,
which pointed to termination of the tribes and citizenship for
tribal members, 33 and the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871,
which ended treaty-making with the tribes 34 - effectively elimi-

28. That conclusion is implicit in the body of Oliphant, and was made explicit in
Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 ("Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our
precedents... ."). The Duro Court justified jurisdiction over members because of the
voluntary membership of the tribes, and concluded that Oliphant's logic precluded
jurisdiction over nonmembers, even if they are Indians. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691-92. But see
Poore, supra note 1, at 60 (criticizing voluntary membership theory).
29. The Court suggested that Congress could permit criminal proceedings against
nonmembers in tribal court. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. Perhaps I am reading too much
into his opinion, but Justice Rehnquist seemed to be hinting that Congress could take
that step without providing for constitutional protections in tribal courts. See id. at 210
("Indian tribes.., gave up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress."). And Congress has acted to permit tribal
court jurisdiction over Indians who are not members of the host tribe, apparently not
seriously concerned about constitutional issues arising from that jurisdiction. See
sources cited supra note 25.
30. Just last term, the Court reemphasized the continued existence of tribal
sovereign immunity. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700
(1998). Although sovereign immunity may often be unimportant, in that sovereigns can
and often do waive that immunity, it remains an aspect of sovereignty.
31. See, e.g., infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
32. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)).
33. Most important was the General Allotment Act of 1887 (popularly known as
the Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified throughout title 25 of the United States
Code). Poore characterizes the Allotment Acts as "a de jure elimination of retained
powers of tribes." Poore, supra note 1, at 63 (footnote omitted).
34. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566; see Poore, supra note 1, at 66
("tribes were no longer regarded as sovereign nations."). Poore construes this Act as
having diminished tribal status, but, in fact, the existing treaties continued in force. See
16 Stat. at 566 ("[N]othing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair
the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian
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nated retained sovereignty: "traditional constitutional law principles, including equal protection, would require that when Congress granted citizenship to all Indians, it eliminated any power
or retained sovereignty of tribes inconsistent with the Constitution."35 That must be news to Congress.
How, for example, can Poore explain something like the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which imposes by statute many

(but not all) of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights? 36
Among its provisions, ICRA contains a prohibition against "unreasonable search and seizures," a double jeopardy clause, a
right against self-incrimination, a due process and equal protection provision, and a right to a jury trial in criminal cases that
could lead to imprisonment. Congress obviously did not think
that the Bill of Rights already limited the powers of Indian
tribes. If Congress had thought that, ICRA would be
37
surplusage.
Poore must think that the Court and Congress are both
blind to the logical implications of what they have done. He sees
the logic that those bodies cannot; sovereignty is dead even
though Congress and the Supreme Court fail to realize it.38
nation or tribe."). The common understanding of the end of treating with the tribes is
that the House of Representatives, which does not participate in treaty-making, wanted
to play a more significant role in the formation of Indian policy. See DAVID H. GETCHES
ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 151-52 (4th ed. 1998).
35. Poore, supra note 1, at 61.
36. See Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-203, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)). Among the exceptions: ICRA contains no
Establishment Clause. It has been assumed, that is, that a tribe may have an
established religion. Although Poore does not address this issue directly, I take it he
thinks a tribal establishment of religion would be improper, whatever ICRA says or does
not say. But tribal religions are generally very different from the more mainstream,
establishment religions; there is a much stronger sense that everything has religious
significance. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[F]or Native Americans religion is not a discrete
sphere of activity separate from all others. ..."). What would be left of traditional tribal
religions if the Establishment Clause were imposed on tribes? How could a tribe
establish a wall between church and state when "church" permeates all of life?
37. To be sure, ICRA has turned out to be largely surplusage anyway, since the
Supreme Court has ruled that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity in enacting
ICRA. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). As a result, persons
harmed by tribal officials have no recourse in federal court, except in habeas actions. See
id. at 58. But Santa Clara actually supports one of my points: the Court's refusal to read
an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity into ICRA is strong evidence that the Court
does not view tribal sovereignty as a dead letter.
38.
I take it that is Poore's point when he argues that Congress' attempt to "revive"
sovereignty in 1934, with the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch.
576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)), was necessarily a
failure. See Poore, supra note 1, at 69. Congress cannot enact "retained" sovereignty.
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That is possible, of course, and the law reviews are full of
essays that are exercises in redefinition: "The cases really mean
X when they say Y," or 'Whatever Congress intended, statute Z
does such-and-such."
But Poore's efforts go beyond - far beyond - the usual essay.
He is not arguing that doctrine Y within American Indian law is
wrong; he is suggesting that the courts and the Congress have
misconstrued the premises of the entire body of American Indian
law. That is a claim of awe-inspiring magnitude. It is as if he
39
were suggesting that judicial review is not the law of the land.
To reorient American Indian law in that way, we need a much
clearer statement of congressional purpose than Poore has been
able to find.
In short, whatever the merit of Poore's logic, it is a logic that
the Supreme Court and Congress have not accepted. The current
state of American Indian law and policy was not inevitable; it
did not develop solely as a matter of logic. But it is no less real
for all that. Like it or not, Indian tribes have a special constitutional status.
II. A FEW SPECIFIC POINTS

I have tried to suggest why Poore's grand argument is misguided. A few more specific points deserve brief rebuttals as
well. First, Poore overstates the extent to which actual assimilation occurred in the past. Second, he exaggerates the constitutional significance of tribal nonmembers' residing in Indian
country. Finally, he overemphasizes the importance of citizenship in constitutional law.
Point one: Poore argues that retained sovereignty was
eliminated in the past and, once that happened, it was gone forever. With sovereignty gone, "Congress started with a clean
slate."40 And when Congress "resurrected tribes, Congress
41
necessarily imposed the Constitution."
Poore sees "resurrection" rather than revival because he

Once abolished, it is gone forever.
39. I do not mean to suggest that scholars ought not reconsider the merits of
judicial review in general and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in
particular. Of course they should. I have a colleague who, as far as I can tell, devotes
about ten weeks of his constitutional law course to Marbury. But an article claiming not
that Marbury was wrong, but that judicial review is not the law today, would strain the
imagination.
40. Poore, supra note 1, at 69; see also supra note 38.
41. Poore, supra note 1, at 80.
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exaggerates the extent to which tribes had disappeared before
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 reinvigorated tribal governments. 42 He regularly uses words like "assimilation" and "integration" to describe not just the goals of federal policy during
various periods of American history, but also what actually hap43
pened to American Indian tribes.
He is wrong. Although federal Indian policy was often
assimilationist in intent, it is not the case that "Indians and
Indian reservations were integrated and assimilated into the
44
United States by congressional, judicial, and other actions."
Indeed, when tribes were officially revived in 1934, following the
devastating disclosures about reservation conditions contained
in the Meriam Report, 45 it was in part because it had become
clear that assimilation had not occurred and perhaps would
46

never occur.

Point two: Poore is concerned about people who live within
Indian country but who, because they are not tribal members,
cannot play a full role in tribal government. He refers to "the
basic constitutional requirement that citizens be allowed to vote
for those individuals their [sic] govern our lives." 47 Whatever
that principle is, it was not a "basic constitutional principle" for
women until 1920,48 for eighteen-year olds until 1971, 49 or for
kids under eighteen today. And I can think of a lot of people who
50
affect my life for whom I cannot vote.

42. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
43. See, e.g., Poore, supra note 1, at 54 (text accompanying note 1).
44. Id. at 53.
45. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE
PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (photo. reprint 1971) (1928).

46. The Meriam Report concluded that assimilation had not happened for all
tribes: "Some Indians proud of their race and devoted to their culture and their mode of
life have no desire to be as the white man is." Id. at 86. If assimilation was unlikely,
federal policy needed to change:
The object of work with or for the Indians is to fit them either to merge into the
social and economic life of the prevailing civilization as developed by the whites
or to live in the presence of that civilization at least in accordance with a
minimum standard of health and decency.
Id. Justice McLean's concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 563
(1832), predicting the ultimate demise of the tribes, is hardly evidence of actual events.
But see Poore, supra note 1, at 58 (quoting McLean opinion at length).
47. Poore, supra note 1, at 76.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
50. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (rejecting
argument that residents of unincorporated community outside Tuscaloosa, who were
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Consider this sentence: "Where tribal governing bodies purport to make laws or rules that impact non-members residing
within the confines of a reservation, then the Constitution requires that non-members be allowed to vote in elections and to
run for office." 5 1 Where does the Constitution say that?52 Is an
Ohio citizen who resides in Florida for all or part of the year entitled to vote in Florida?53
It is true that a difference of potentially constitutional dimension is that Ohio citizens can take steps to shift their
citizenship to Florida, while membership in tribes is limited and limited by race. 54 But the law is as clear as it can be that the
racial policies of American Indian tribes present no constitu55
tional problems.
Point three: Poore attaches extraordinary significance to the
various legislative acts that culminated in the 1924 enactment
under which Congress made previously unnaturalized American
Indians U.S. citizens. 56 In his view, citizenship fundamentally
changed the Indians' relationship to the American polity.
Yes and no. Yes, the 1924 statute was important, effectively
conferring on American Indians the right to vote in federal and
state elections,5 7 and opening up the possibility of running for
58
federal offices for which citizenship is a requirement.
subject to Tuscaloosa police and sanitary regulations, were entitled to vote in Tuscaloosa
elections).
51. Poore, supra note 1, at 77. Congress was "precluded from providing for the
creation of any tribal governments or tribal judicial systems that do not comport with the
Constitution of the United States. Because of the de facto integration of Indian and nonIndian cultures on reservations, to the extent that Congress has not acted or has not
acted properly, the Constitution is self-implementing." Id. at 54. Even if Poore were right
about this principle, I take it that closed reservations, where there is no significant nonIndian population, might be governed by different standards.
52. The Supreme Court has been most careful in protecting the voting rights of
residents. See Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68-69. But the Court has never said that
residence itself entitles a person to vote. See id. at 69 ("Bona fide residence alone...
does not automatically confer the right to vote on all matters .... "); see also Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (rejecting right-tovote claim by nonlandowner residents of special water district).
53. He might have to pay Florida as well as Ohio taxes, but that fact alone does
not entitle him to vote in Florida as a constitutional matter.
54. See Poore, supra note 1, at 77.
55. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974).
56. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
57. Constitutionally protected voting rights apply to citizens. See U.S. CONST.
amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
58. Representatives, senators, and the president must be citizens. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 2; art. I, § 3, cl. 3; art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
On the other hand, the extension of citizenship also subjected most American
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But citizenship's constitutional significance should not be
exaggerated. One of the striking things about the Constitution is
how seldom the word "citizen" and its derivatives are used in the
document. 59 In general, personal constitutional rights apply to
"persons," and the use of the broader term does not appear to
have been an oversight. Poore states, "The Fourteenth Amendment provides equal protection for citizens of states." 60 Wrong. It
provides equal protection for persons. After defining citizenship
and referring to "citizens" in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, 61 the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
continues: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or Property, without due Process of law, nor deny to any person
62
within its jurisdiction the equal Protection of the laws."
Persons are almost always the constitutionally significant entities, not citizens.
In the 1924 act Congress did not confer new procedural protections on American Indians. As far as interactions with federal
and state courts were concerned, Indians already had the same
rights as other persons - due process, the privilege against selfincrimination, and so on. Does Poore think that non-citizens are
not protected by the Bill of Rights in criminal proceedings in the
United States? Does a Frenchman have to become a U.S. citizen
to be entitled to procedural protections in a U.S. court? Of course
not.
Perhaps constitutional protections should apply in tribal
courts, but it is hard to see what the citizenship status of American Indians has to do with that issue.

Indians to the federal taxing regime. It eliminated the special category of "Indians not
taxed" - persons not counted for purposes of determining representation and
apportionment of direct taxes. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; amend. XIV, § 2.
59. Provisions governing voting and qualifications for federal elective office include
citizenship requirements. See supra notes 57-58. Some jurisdictional rules are expressed
in terms of citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. And the privileges and
immunities clauses speak to citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; amend. XIV, §
1.
60. Poore, supra note 1, at 75.
61. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court
occasionally emphasizes the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment's reference to
persons rather than citizens. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (holding
that, within territory of jurisdiction, Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons,
including aliens with substantial connections to this country); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protects resident aliens).
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III. HAS POORE PROVIDED A VISION OF THE FuTuRE?

Mr. Poore is unconvincing in describing the current state of
American Indian law. But I suspect that, if he cannot convince
us that tribal sovereignty is already dead, his project has an alternative goal: he would like his views to guide our future. Is it
possible that Poore's argument will hasten the demise of tribal
sovereignty?
Anything can happen, I suppose, but I am skeptical. Of one
thing I am sure: if tribal sovereignty dies, it will not be the Supreme Court administering last rites. For the Court to proclaim
the death of tribal sovereignty, without Congress' first having
issued an order for the execution, would require rejection of
nearly two centuries of jurisprudence. No matter how negatively
some Supreme Court justices view American Indian tribes,63 a
repudiation of that magnitude is inconceivable.64
Congress is another matter, of course. If one takes the federal plenary power doctrine seriously - and, whether one likes
the doctrine or not, many American Indian law commentators do
take it seriously65 - perhaps Congress can eliminate American
Indian law with the statutory equivalent of the stroke of a pen.66
But I do not see that, or anything else that approximates
the elimination of tribal sovereignty, 67 happening. The post63.

Actually, most justices have been surprisingly friendly over the years. See

CHARLES F. WILKINSON,

AMERICAN

INDIANS, TIME,

AND

THE LAW

120-22

(1987)

(concluding that the Supreme Court, despite its faults, has generally been a protector of
tribal interests).
64. Chipping away at the edges of tribal sovereignty might very well happen; it
has happened often in the past. But, in light of the past ebbs and flows of American
Indian law, why should we think that incremental changes will always take us closer to
sovereignty's death?
65. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
66. I do not necessarily accept this expansive interpretation of the plenary power
doctrine - that the power to regulate commerce with the "Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, includes the power to terminate those tribes - but I will accept it for
purposes of this discussion. But see supra note 18 (noting that the Constitution might
protect some aspects of sovereignty).
67. For the record, let me express some doubt that Congress could make the
Constitution applicable to tribes in the way that Poore suggests, even if we were to
concede that Congress could eliminate the tribes altogether. I agree with Professor
Laurence that Congress could mandate 'constitution-like guarantees for persons affected
by the exercise of tribal sovereignty." Laurence, supra note 12, at 418-19 (footnote
omitted). In that case, Congress would be exercising its plenary power, derived from the
Indian Commerce Clause, over the "Indian Tribes." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But
I am not at all sure that the Constitution would permit Congress to make the tribes into
the equivalents of subdivisions of the federal government, with tribal courts that are
nothing but another class of federal courts. See supra note 16. If the tribes really have
already lost all sovereign powers, they should no longer be "Indian Tribes" with special
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World War II revival of support for tribal sovereignty was not a
product of only Democratic administrations and Congresses.
Richard Nixon, for example, made one of the strongest statements by an American politician in this century in support of
68
tribal self-determination.
In any event, if tribal sovereignty does disappear as a result
of congressional action, it will be because the legislature determines that sovereignty has outlasted its time, not because Mr.
Poore will have convinced the country of his argument's merits.
Poore's argument, after all, is that sovereignty is already dead
as a matter of law; no further congressional step is necessary.
Taking the argument at face value points toward congressional
inaction; it hardly provides support for further congressional
evisceration of a doctrine Poore thinks is already eviscerated. If
Congress has to act, it will be because Mr. Poore is wrong about
the current state of the law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I am not opposed to wishful thinking; I do a lot of it myself.
And I am more sympathetic to Mr. Poore's project than almost
all other writers in the academic Indian law literature will be. I
am skeptical that public policy should be blessing the idea of
separate groups of racially defined peoples in the United
States. 69 When "multiculturalism" means emphasis on differences and separation, rather than on commonalities, it is not an
idea I embrace.
But Mr. Poore does not purport to be describing his ideal
world; he purports to be describing the law as it is today, if only
we would correctly understand what has gone before. In that respect Mr. Poore is, quite simply, dead wrong. A good
imagination goes only so far.

constitutional status. Why then do tribal courts exist at all? Even under the broadest
interpretation of plenary power, can Congress simply reconstitute a group of American
citizens as a subdivision of the federal government?
68. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PuB. PAPERS Doc.
No. 213 (July 8, 1970).
69. I have expressed skepticism about the desirability of separation. See Erik M.
Jensen, Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth
Anniversary on the Federal Bench, 1987 BYU L. REV. 1103; Erik M. Jensen, American
Indians, Time, and the Law, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 318 (1987) (reviewing WILKINSON,
supra note 63); see also Jensen, supra note 17.
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